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ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 This appeal concerns an adversary proceeding filed by 
Debra and David Hayden, who are the debtors in a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy proceeding.  The subject of the adversary proceeding 
is a prior transaction in which Debra Hayden, in return for a 
cash payment, purported to assign to Western United Life 
Assurance Company her right to receive certain future periodic 
payments.  In the adversary proceeding, the Haydens maintained 
that these periodic payments belonged to the bankruptcy estate 
because Debra Hayden's transaction did not constitute an 
effective assignment.  The bankruptcy court agreed and entered 
summary judgment in favor of the Haydens.  The district court 
affirmed the bankruptcy court's order.  We now reverse and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. 
 In 1984, Debra Hayden sustained injuries as a result of 
allegedly negligent medical treatment.  App. 52.  She 
subsequently filed a malpractice suit against the treating 
physicians, the hospital and their respective liability insurance 
company (collectively the "medical defendants").0  Id.   
                                                           
0The settlement agreement to the malpractice action contains a 
provision proscribing the Haydens from publicizing the facts or 
terms of the settlement.  The Haydens have moved this court to 
maintain the confidentiality of this agreement.  We will 
therefore refer to the defendants only as the medical defendants. 
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 In February 1988, Ms. Hayden settled her suit with the 
medical defendants.  Id.  She executed a settlement agreement 
that stated:   
For and In Consideration of the sum of three 
hundred ten thousand dollars ($310,000) to me 
paid in hand by [the medical defendants] 
. . . the receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged,** I, being of lawful age, 
hereby fully and forever release, acquit and 
discharge the said [medical defendants] . . . 
from any and all actions . . . on account of 
any and all known and unknown injuries . . . 
sustained by me . . . as a result of medical 
treatment received by [me] from [the medical 
defendants]. 
 
** (and the payment of $290,000 to United 
Pacific Life Ins. Co. for the purchase of an 
annuity contract)  
Western's Br. at Exhibit 1.  The medical defendants then entered 
into a qualified assignment and assumption agreement with 
Reliance Insurance Company ("Reliance").  In pertinent part, this 
agreement stated: 
Whereas, the Settlement Agreement provides 
for the [defendants] to make certain periodic 
payments to or for the benefit of [Ms. 
Hayden]. 
 
Whereas, the [defendants] desires to assign 
to [Reliance] its liability to make such 
periodic payments pursuant to the conditions 
of Internal Revenue Code [§] 130(c) . . . . 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, . . . the parties hereto 
agree as follows: 
 
1.  Liabilities Assigned.  The 
[defendants] hereby assigns and 
[Reliance] hereby assumes all of the 
[defendants'] liability to make the 
periodic payments to [Ms. Hayden]. . . . 
 
2.  Funding of Periodic Payments. 
[Reliance] may fund the periodic 
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payments . . . by purchasing a 
"qualified funding asset" within the 
meaning of I.R.C. [§] 130(d), in the 
form of an annuity contract from United 
. . . .  All rights of ownership and 
control of such annuity shall be vested 
in [Reliance].  However, for 
[Reliance's] convenience, [Reliance] 
directs United . . . to make the 
payments to . . . [Ms. Hayden] . . . . 
Id. at Exhibit 2.  With funds provided by the medical defendants, 
Reliance then purchased a $290,000 annuity from United Pacific 
Life Assurance Company ("United").  Western Life Assurance Co. v. 
Hayden, No. 93-1850, 94-517, 94-518, at 2 (W.D.Pa. Sept. 20, 
1994); App. 53.  The annuity provided for monthly payments of 
$2,159.37 for the longer of 30 years or the remainder of Ms. 
Hayden's life.  App. 63.  The annuity designated Reliance as the 
owner and Ms. Hayden as the payee.  Id. at 60.   
 In January 1989, the Haydens were experiencing 
financial difficulties.  In re Hayden, No. 92-2261, Adv. No. 92-
0301, at 3 (Bankr. W.D.Pa. Oct. 13, 1993).  To alleviate these 
difficulties, the Haydens contacted Donald Bach, who arranged for 
at least five loans in various amounts totalling more than 
$50,000.  App. 53-54.  In consideration for these loans, the 
Haydens agreed to pay back double the amount of the principal in 
60 equal monthly payments.  Western at 3.   
 Despite these loans, the Haydens continued to 
experience financial difficulties.  In re Hayden at 4.  In early 
1990, Ms. Hayden asked Bach to consolidate the loans so as to 
reduce the monthly payments.  App. 54.  Bach advised Ms. Hayden 
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that although consolidation was not possible, he might be able to 
arrange for the purchase of the annuity contract.  Id.  
 In July 1990, Bach contacted Western United Life 
Assurance Company ("Western") to inquire whether Western had an 
interest in purchasing Ms. Hayden's annuity.  Id.  Western 
indicated an interest.  On July 24, 1990, Western prepared a 
letter from Ms. Hayden addressed to Reliance.  Id.  This letter 
stated that Ms. Hayden had entered into an arrangement with 
Western and that pursuant to this arrangement she had conveyed 
her rights under the settlement agreement, including her right to 
receive the monthly annuity payments.  Id. at 77.  The letter 
asked Reliance to request that United change the annuity 
beneficiary to Western and to send future payments directly to 
Western.  Id.     
 On August 10, representatives of Reliance and Western 
spoke.  Id. at 55.  Reliance informed Western that it would not 
honor Ms. Hayden's request.  Id. at 79.  Reliance explained that 
it was the owner of the annuity and that Ms. Hayden had no 
assignable rights in the policy.  Id.  After subsequent 
discussions between Reliance and Western, the two settled on the 
following mutually acceptable method of executing the assignment. 
Although Reliance insisted that the checks remain payable to Ms. 
Hayden, it agreed to honor a request from Ms. Hayden to change 
irrevocably the address to which the checks were sent to that of 
Western.  Id. at 81. 
 In September 1990, the parties executed a series of 
documents in an attempt to assign to Western Ms. Hayden's rights 
7 
to the monthly payments.0  In pertinent part, Ms. Hayden executed 
a document entitled "Annuity (Payment) Assignment Agreement." The 
document stated: 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED . . . [Debra A. 
Hayden] does hereby assign, transfer, and set 
over to Western . . . all Assignor's right, 
title and interest in and to the periodic 
payments described below together with 
Assignor's existing rights and interest . . . 
in and to the following described annuity 
contract/policy and related release and/or 
settlement agreement . . . . 
Western's Br. at Exhibit 5.  The document then identified with 
specificity the monthly payments, the annuity contract, and the 
settlement agreement.  Ms. Hayden also directed Reliance to have 
United irrevocably change the address to which the checks were 
sent to that of Western.  Id. at Exhibit 4.  Finally, because the 
annuity checks remained payable to Ms. Hayden, she executed an 
irrevocable special power of attorney empowering Western to 
endorse and cash the checks.  Id. at Exhibit 6.  In return, 
Western paid Ms. Hayden $178,395.63, of which $92,420.63 was used 
to satisfy the loans.  App. 58; Western at 4.  Pursuant to these 
arrangements, the monthly payments were received and deposited by 
Western from the end of 1990 until August 1992.  App. 58. 
 On May 14, 1992, Debra and David Hayden filed a 
voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy 
code.  Western at 5.  Subsequently, the Haydens filed a six-count 
adversary complaint against Western, United, and Reliance.0  In 
                                                           
0Other documents included beneficiary consents by David Hayden 
and by Ms. Hayden's daughter and various option agreements.  App. 
90-93. 
0Count I requested a determination of Western's secured status 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506 or an avoidance of a lien pursuant to 
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this complaint, the Haydens alleged that the September 1990 
documents executed by Ms. Hayden did not create an effective 
assignment.  Thus, the Haydens argued that the annuity checks 
were property of the estate and that the court should order 
Western to turn over these checks to the estate.  Similarly, the 
Haydens maintained that Western was only an unsecured creditor of 
the estate for a sum equal to the value of its bargain with Ms. 
Hayden less any prepetition annuity checks it received and 
cashed.   
 The parties moved for summary judgment on the adversary 
complaint.  In re Hayden at 1.  The bankruptcy court entered 
partial summary judgment in favor of the Haydens.0  Id. at 14. 
The court held that the documents executed by Ms. Hayden did not 
create an effective assignment and that the monthly annuity 
payments were the property of the bankruptcy estate.  Thus, the 
court ruled that Western was an unsecured creditor and ordered 
Western to surrender the postpetition annuity payments to the 
Chapter 13 trustee.  Id. 
 The bankruptcy court subsequently confirmed the 
Hayden's Chapter 13 plan.  In pertinent part, the plan provided 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 U.S.C. § 522.  Count II sought to void, under 11 U.S.C. § 552, 
any security interest asserted by Western in the annuity 
payments.  Count III alleged that Western violated that automatic 
stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362.  Count IV sought, pursuant to 
11 U.S.C. § 542, the turnover of the postpetition annuity 
payments received by Western on the ground that they were 
property of the bankruptcy estate.  Count V maintained that by 
receiving the checks Western benefitted from a preference 
proscribed by 11 U.S.C. § 547.  Finally, Count VI alleged that 
Reliance and United, in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 543, disbursed 
to Western funds belonging to bankruptcy the estate.  
0The court made no determination regarding counts III and V. 
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that all monthly annuity payments from the commencement of the 
case to the date of consummation would be surrendered to the 
trustee for distribution to the creditors.  Western at 5.  For 
the first six months after consummation, the Haydens were to 
receive the monthly annuity checks, from which $870 would be 
given to the trustee for distribution to the creditors.  Id.  The 
remaining portion of the annuity checks for this six-month 
period, as well as the full amount of all subsequent annuity 
checks, was excluded as a payment reasonably necessary for the 
support of the debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E).  Thus, the 
effect of the bankruptcy court's ruling in the adversary 
proceeding and its approval of the plan was that the Haydens 
continued to receive the annuity payments while Western received 
only a small percentage of the sum it paid to Ms. Hayden for her 
purported assignment. 
 Western separately appealed to the district court the 
bankruptcy court's decisions to grant summary judgment and to 
approve the plan.0  The district court affirmed the bankruptcy 
court's holding that the documents executed by Ms. Hayden failed 
to create an effective assignment.  The district court focused on 
Ms. Hayden's rights under the annuity contract.  It explained 
that because Ms. Hayden was not the owner of the annuity she did 
not possess the legal right to change the designated beneficiary 
of the annuity.  Western at 8.  Therefore, the court concluded, 
"it is a simple matter to conclude that she could not assign the 
                                                           
0Western also appealed a third bankruptcy court decision not 
relevant to this appeal. 
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right to receive the annuity payments . . . ."  Id.  The district 
court also affirmed the bankruptcy court's confirmation of the 
plan.  Id. at 10. 
 Western then appealed both decisions to this court. The 
present appeal concerns only the bankruptcy court's ruling with 
respect to the adversary action.0  Western contends that it, 
rather than the Haydens' estate, possesses the right to receive 
the monthly payments.  Western believes that the district court 
improperly focused only on Ms. Hayden's rights under the annuity 
contract.  It argues that Ms. Hayden assigned all her rights 
under the annuity contract and settlement agreement and that 
these rights included the right to receive the monthly annuity 
payments.  The Haydens respond by arguing that Ms. Hayden could 
not have executed an effective assignment because she did not 
have any assignable rights under either document and that even if 




 We exercise plenary review over an appeal from an order 
granting summary judgment.  Rosen v. Bezner, 996 F.2d 1527, 1530 
(3d Cir. 1993).  We look to Pennsylvania law to determine whether 
                                                           
0Western filed two appeals with this court.  The present appeal, 
No. 94-3548, concerns only the adversary proceeding. Appeal No. 
94-3549 challenges the confirmation of the plan.  In light of our 
holding in the present appeal, we need not, and do not, consider 
the merits of appeal No. 94-3549. 
0Western raised several alternative arguments.  In light of our 
holding, we need not and do not reach these arguments. 
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the documents executed by Ms. Hayden constituted an effective 
assignment.0  Under Pennsylvania law, "when interpreting a 
contract a court must determine the intent of the parties and 
effect must be given to all provisions in the contract."  Dept. 
of Transp. v. Manor Mines, Inc., 565 A.2d 428, 432 (Pa. 
1989)(citations omitted).  If a written contract is clear and 
unambiguous, then the court construes the contract as a matter of 
law by its contents alone.  Id.; Allegheny International v. 
Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 40 F.3d 1416, 1424 (3d Cir. 1994). 
If, however, the contract is ambiguous, then "in order to 
ascertain th[e intention of the parties], the court may consider 
the surrounding circumstances, the situation of the parties, the 
objects they apparently have in view and the nature of the 
subject-matter of the agreement."  International Organization 
Master, Mates and Pilots of America, Local No. 2 v. International 
Organization Master, Mates and Pilots of America, Inc., 439 A.2d 
621, 624 (Pa. 1981).   
 
A. 
 We begin our inquiry by considering whether the annuity 
assignment agreement executed by Ms. Hayden in September of 1990 
created an effective assignment.  According to the language of 
that document, Ms. Hayden agreed to "assign, transfer, and set 
over to Western . . . all [her] right, title and interest . . . 
                                                           
0All parties agree that Pennsylvania law governs this case. We 
agree.  We note that the relevant documents were executed in 
Pennsylvania and that the Haydens reside in Pennsylvania. 
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in and to the . . . annuity contract/policy and related release 
and/or settlement agreement . . . ."  Western's Br. at Exhibit 5. 
We find that this language inescapably and unambiguously 
expresses an intent by Ms. Hayden to assign to Western all her 
rights under the annuity contract and the settlement agreement. 
 The Haydens argue that despite this clear language, the 
document is not an assignment.  Rather, they contend that the 
document is merely a contract to transfer funds to be received in 
the future.  Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 330, a 
contract to make a future assignment of a right or to transfer 
proceeds to be received in the future is not an assignment.   
 Our review of section 330, however, convinces us that 
the September 1990 document created an effective assignment. 
Section 330 distinguishes between, on the one hand, an obligee's 
intention to bind himself contractually to make a future 
assignment and, on the other, an intention to make a present 
assignment.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 330, 
comments a-b.  The former is merely a contract, but the latter is 
an assignment.  The test is whether the obligee manifests an 
intention to transfer present ownership of the right.  Id.; see 
also Melnick v. Pennsylvania Co. for Banking and Trusts, 119 A.2d 
825, 826 (Pa. Super. 1956)(in banc)(finding that the statement "I 
. . . hereby authorize and empower you . . . to . . . assign" was 
not an assignment because "these words indicate[d] no present 
intent to transfer or divest oneself from the right to demand 
possession of the [subject matter of the agreement]."); Daymut v. 
Commonwealth Dept. of Public Welfare, 410 A.2d 1318, 1319 (Pa. 
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Cmwlth 1980)(finding document not to be an assignment because it 
did not "indicate a present intent of the obligor to divest 
himself of any right to demand possession of [the subject matter 
of the agreement].")0   
 In the present case, the document executed by Ms. 
Hayden used the present tense and stated that Ms. Hayden "does 
hereby assign . . . ."  We believe that this language clearly 
indicates an intent to make a present assignment.  Thus, we find 
that this document was intended to create an effective assignment 
and not a contract to make a future assignment.  We conclude, 
therefore, that the September 1990 documents executed by Ms. 
Hayden created an effective legal assignment of Ms. Hayden's 
rights under the annuity contract and settlement agreement.  This 
conclusion does not end our inquiry, however, because we must 
determine exactly what rights Ms. Hayden was empowered to assign 
under these two agreements.  We next turn to this issue. 
 
B. 
 To determine whether Ms. Hayden had assignable rights 
under the annuity contract or the settlement agreement, we must 
consider each of these documents.  With respect to the annuity 
contract, Western concedes that Ms. Hayden did not have a legally 
assignable right under this contract.0  Western's Br. at 15. 
                                                           
0Although Pennsylvania courts have not explicitly adopted § 330, 
we believe that Melnick and Daymut indicate that Pennsylvania 
does follow this section. 
0Although Western concedes that Ms. Hayden did not have a legally 
assignable right, it argues that Ms. Hayden's assignment of her 
expectancy interest in the annuity payments is enforceable in 
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Western and the Haydens agree that Reliance is the undisputed 
owner of the annuity.  Id.  As owner, the annuity contract vests 
Reliance with the right to change the payee and to direct the 
annuity payments to whomever it desires.  App. 65.  Because Ms. 
Hayden did not have an enforceable right to remain as the annuity 
payee, Western concedes that she could not assign a right to 
receive those payments.  Western's Br. at 15, 27.  Thus, we 
consider Ms. Hayden's rights under the settlement agreement. 
 Western argues that under the settlement agreement Ms. 
Hayden had a legally assignable right to receive the monthly 
payments.  Western interprets this agreement as requiring 
Reliance, as the medical defendants' assignee, to pay Ms. Hayden 
the periodic payments from the annuity or from another source. 
Western's Br. at 29.  Because the agreement created a right to 
receive the periodic payments, Western argues that Ms. Hayden 
could assign this right to receive the payments.   
 The Haydens, however, contend that Ms. Hayden had no 
assignable rights under the settlement agreement.  Although their 
exact interpretation of the settlement agreement is unclear, they 
appear to argue that it required only the purchase of an annuity 
for the benefit of Ms. Hayden and nothing more.  The Haydens 
reject Western's claim that the settlement agreement created a 
contractual obligation to make the periodic payments independent 
of the purchase of the annuity.  Ms. Hayden, they observe, 
released the medical defendants from liability in consideration 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
equity.  Western's Br. at 28.  In light of our holding, we need 
not and do not consider this issue. 
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of a cash payment and "the payment of $290,000 to United Pacific 
Life Ins. Co. for the purchase of an annuity contract . . . ." 
Western's Br. at Exhibit 1.  Thus, the Haydens maintain that 
because the settlement agreement did not require more than the 
purchase of an annuity and because the annuity was purchased, Ms. 
Hayden did not have any remaining assignable rights under the 
agreement.   
 We believe that the language of the settlement 
agreement is ambiguous and could support either of these 
interpretations.  The ambiguity arises from the fact that the 
literal language of the agreement does not define the 
relationship between Ms. Hayden and the annuity.  Thus, one can 
imply various relationships between them.  We offer a few 
illustrative examples:  (1) the medical defendants must purchase 
the annuity and assign it to Ms. Hayden; (2) the medical 
defendants must purchase the annuity and irrevocably name Ms. 
Hayden as payee; (3) the medical defendants must purchase the 
annuity and use it as security for their obligation to Ms. 
Hayden; or (4) the medical defendants must purchase the annuity 
but need not use it even as security for their obligation to Ms. 
Hayden.     
 Because the language of the settlement agreement is 
ambiguous, to determine the intent of the parties we look to the 
surrounding circumstances, the situation of the parties, and the 
objects they apparently have in view.  International Organization 
Master, Mates and Pilots of America, 439 A.2d at 624.  Western 
argues that when these factors are considered, it is clear as a 
16 
matter of law that the medical defendants, Reliance, and Ms. 
Hayden intended to enter into a "structured settlement" in 
accordance with §§ 104(a)(2) and 130 of the Internal Revenue Code 
("I.R.C."), 26 U.S.C. §§ 104(a)(2), 130.  Western further 
maintains that a structured settlement would require Ms. Hayden 
to retain a right to periodic payments under the settlement 
agreement.  Thus, contends Western, the parties to that agreement 
intended to vest Ms. Hayden with an assignable right to receive 
the payments under the agreement.  We consider each prong of 
Western's argument in turn. 
 Structured settlements are a type of settlement 
designed to provide certain tax advantages.  In a typical 
personal injury settlement, a plaintiff who receives a lump-sum 
payment may exclude this payment from taxable income under I.R.C. 
§ 104(a)(2) (providing that the amount of any damages received on 
account of personal injuries or sickness are excludable from 
income).  However, any return from the plaintiff's investment of 
the lump-sum payment is taxable investment income.  In contrast, 
in a structured settlement the claimant receives periodic 
payments rather than a lump sum, and all of these payments are 
considered damages received on account of personal injuries or 
sickness and are thus excludable from income.  Accordingly, a 
structured settlement effectively shelters from taxation the 
returns from the investment of the lump-sum payment.  See Rev. 
Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74.  See also Sen. Rep. No. 97-646, 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4580, 4583 
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(explaining that Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2605, codified Rev. 
Rul. 79-220 at 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2)). 
 A key characteristic of a structured settlement is that 
the beneficiary of the settlement must not have actual or 
constructive receipt of the economic benefit of the payments. 
Rev. Rul. 79-220.  In a structured settlement, the settling 
defendant's "purchase of a[n] . . . annuity contract from the 
other insurance company [is] merely an investment by [the 
settling defendant] to provide a source of funds for [him] to 
satisfy [his] obligation to [the plaintiff]."  Id.  The 
arrangement is "merely a matter of convenience to the [defendant] 
and d[oes] not give the recipient any right in the annuity 
itself."  Id.  (emphasis added).  Because the recipient never had 
actual or constructive receipt of the lump-sum amount, the 
recipient need not include the investment yield on that amount as 
taxable income.  Id.  Thus, the exclusion applies to the full 
amount of the annuity payments because the full amount is 
received as damages on account of personal injuries.  Id.  
 Before 1983, the utility of structured settlements was 
diminished by the credit risk that the recipient would have to 
assume.  William Winslow, Tax Reform Preserves Structured 
Settlements, 65 Taxes 22, 24 (1987).  Because the annuity was 
merely a matter of convenience and did not give the recipient any 
right in the annuity, in the case of the settling defendant's 
default the plaintiff could not seek redress from the annuity 
issuer.  Id.  This presented a problem if the settling 
defendant's general credit risk was high.   
18 
 Congress addressed this problem by enacting I.R.C. 
§130.  See Sen. Rep. No. 97-646, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted 
in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4580, 4583.  As we detail in subsection C of 
this opinion, section 130 allows a tax-neutral transaction in 
which the settling defendant assigns and a third party assumes 
the obligation to make periodic payments under most section 
104(a)(2) structured settlements.  When the third party assignee, 
such as Reliance, has a credit rating superior to that of the 
settling defendant, such an assignment and assumption agreement 
benefits a plaintiff, such as Ms. Hayden, by allowing her to rely 
on the assignee's superior credit.  Winslow, supra. 
 In the instant case, it is apparent that Ms. Hayden, 
the medical defendants and Reliance structured the settlement to 
conform with the requirements of sections 104 and 130.  Indeed, 
the parties to the present case agree that the assignment and 
assumption agreement was designed to "follow[] the road map laid 
out in I.R.C. § 130 . . ." and that the annuity was purchased as 
part of a structured settlement agreement.  See Hayden's Br. at 
19, 28; Western's Br. at 4.  The language of the assignment and 
assumption agreement confirms this.0  The agreement expressly 
                                                           
0Although Ms. Hayden was not a signatory to this the assignment 
and assumption agreement, this agreement provides evidence of her 
intent in executing the settlement agreement. When construing an 
ambiguous contract which by necessary implication refers to 
another document, the court may look to such document as 
additional evidence in order to ascertain the intention of the 
parties.  International Organization Master, Mates and Pilots, 
439 A.2d at 625.  Moreover, as we explain below, under 
Pennsylvania law when two or more writings are executed as part 
of one transaction they should be construed together.  Finally, 
we also observe that in the assignment and assumption agreement, 
the medical defendants "warrant[ed] that [Ms. Hayden . . . 
19 
stated that it was intended to create an assignment pursuant to 
the conditions of section 130.  Moreover, the assignment and 
assumption agreement complied with the requirements of a section 
104(a)(2) structured settlement.  The agreement stated that  
Reliance may fund the periodic payments . . . 
by purchasing a[n] . . . annuity contract 
from United . . . .  All rights of ownership 
and control of such annuity shall be vested 
in [Reliance].  However, for [Reliance's] 
convenience, [Reliance] directs United to 
make the payments to . . . [Ms. Hayden]      
. . . . 
Western's Br. at Exhibit 2 (emphasis added).  Thus, the agreement 
explicitly complied with the Revenue Ruling by stating that the 
annuity was merely a convenient method by which Reliance could 
fund the obligation and that Reliance, and not Ms. Hayden, 
exercised ownership and control over the annuity. 
 Our conclusion that the medical defendants, Reliance 
and Ms. Hayden intended to enter into a structured settlement 
clarifies the scope of Ms. Hayden's rights under the structured 
settlement.  As previously explained, under a structured 
settlement the obligor has a continuing obligation to pay the 
periodic payments to the recipient.  The annuity is merely a 
convenient funding mechanism and does not alter this obligation. 
Thus, we believe it is clear as a matter of law that under the 
settlement agreement the medical defendants had a continuing 
obligation to pay Ms. Hayden the monthly payments.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
consented to the assumption of [the] obligation as direct 
obligation of Reliance . . . and in substitution of the 
Assignor."  Western's Br. at Exhibit 2.  The Haydens do not argue 
that Ms. Hayden did not consent to the agreement as warranted. 
20 
 The Haydens' arguments to the contrary are 
contradictory.  While conceding that the parties followed the 
"roadmap laid out in I.R.C. § 130" and that the annuity "was 
purchased as the most significant part of a very specific 
structured settlement agreement," the Haydens argue that the 
annuity contract was not merely an accommodation to Reliance and 
that Reliance has no obligation to make periodic payments 
independent of the annuity.  Hayden's Br. at 19, 28.  The Haydens 
argument reveals a misunderstanding of structured settlements. If 
the parties intended to structure the transaction pursuant to 
I.R.C. §§ 104 and 130, then they must have intended that the 
annuity be merely an accommodation and that Reliance have a 
general obligation to make the periodic payments.  Furthermore, 
the Haydens' interpretation would 
render the assignment and assumption agreement meaningless.  If 
the sole obligation under the settlement agreement was to 
purchase the annuity, there would be no point to inserting 
Reliance into the transaction; the medical defendants could have 
purchased the annuity themselves and thereby fulfilled all their 
obligations.  It is thus apparent that the defendants executed 
the assignment because under the settlement agreement they had a 
continuing obligation that they wished to assign, namely, the 
obligation to make periodic payments.  We conclude, therefore, 
that the settlement agreement gave Ms. Hayden a legal right to 
receive monthly payments of $2159.37.  We next consider whether 




 A contractual right to receive a future stream of 
payments is typically assignable.  E. Allan Farnsworth, 
Farnsworth on Contracts §11.2 (1990).  The Haydens argue, 
however, that even if the settlement agreement vested Ms. Hayden 
with a legal right to receive the monthly payments, this right 
was not assignable.  The Haydens support this assertion with two 
arguments.   
 First, the Haydens argue that the parties to the 
structured settlement must have intended impliedly to restrict 
the assignment of Ms. Hayden's right to receive the monthly 
payments.  They premise this argument on their belief that an 
assignment by Ms. Hayden would cause negative tax consequences 
for Reliance and that to avoid such a result the parties must 
have intended to restrict the assignment of the payments. 
According to the Haydens, in order for Reliance to exclude from 
income the amount it received for agreeing to the assignment, the 
periodic payments it agreed to make must be excludable from the 
payee's gross income under section 104(a)(2).  See I.R.C. 
§ 130(a),(c)(2)(E).  Thus, they conclude that the agreement must 
impliedly restrict assignments because the payments are 
excludable only if Ms. Hayden is the payee. 
 We consider the operation of section 130 for the 
limited purpose of assessing whether the parties intended 
impliedly to restrict assignments.  The Internal Revenue Code 
defines gross income broadly to include "all income from whatever 
source derived . . . ."  I.R.C. § 61.   Under section 130(a), 
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however, an assignee may exclude from gross income "[a]ny amount 
received for agreeing to a qualified assignment . . . to the 
extent that such amount does not exceed the aggregate cost of a 
qualified funding asset."  A qualified assignment is one that 
satisfies certain criteria, one of which requires that the 
periodic payments assigned must be excludable from the 
recipient's gross income under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).  See I.R.C. 
§130(c)(2)(E).  Furthermore, a qualified funding asset is an 
annuity contract meeting certain requirements and purchased by 
the assignee within 60 days of the assignment.  See I.R.C. 
§130(d). 
 When an assignee receives an amount for agreeing to a 
qualified assignment, the assignee may use that amount to 
purchase an annuity that satisfies the criteria of a qualified 
funding asset.  I.R.C. § 130(a).  If the assignee does so, the 
assignee can exclude the amount used to purchase the annuity from 
income.  Because this amount was excluded, the basis of the 
annuity is then reduced by that amount.  I.R.C. § 130(b).  In the 
future, the income from the annuity is offset, presumably by a 
business expense deduction, when these payments are distributed 
to the payee.  See C.C.H. Standard Federal Tax Reports ¶ 7383 
(1994).  See generally I.R.C. §§ 61, 162.0 
                                                           
0An example may be helpful.  Assume a settling defendant pays a 
third party $100,000 for its agreement to assume an obligation to 
make periodic payments under a structured settlement.  Assume 
further that the assignment is a qualified assignment under 
I.R.C. § 130(c).  If the third party purchases an $95,000 
qualified funding asset then it has $5000 of income.  The basis 
of the annuity is reduced to $0.  All future income from the 
annuity is taxable income, which presumably is offset by a 
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 In the present case, Reliance presumably exercised its 
section 130 exclusion when it assumed the medical defendants' 
obligation.  The Haydens would have us conclude that Reliance 
would retroactively lose this exclusion if Ms. Hayden assigned 
her right to receive the periodic payments under the settlement 
agreement.  Thus, they would have us infer that, upon Ms. 
Hayden's assignment of the payments, the original cost of the 
annuity less the annuity payments already received as income by 
Reliance becomes income to Reliance and the basis of the annuity 
is increased accordingly.  The Haydens, however, do not cite, and 
our research has failed to reveal, any support for this novel 
proposition.  We are therefore unpersuaded by the Haydens theory, 
and we decline to infer that the settlement agreement was 
intended to limit assignment of Ms. Hayden's right to receive the 
periodic payments.  
 The Haydens present a second reason why they believe 
that even if Ms. Hayden had a legal right to receive the monthly 
payments, this right was not assignable.  They contend that the 
settlement agreement must be read together with the annuity 
contract and that a provision of the annuity contract prevents 
the assignment of Ms. Haydens' rights under both that contract 
and the settlement agreement. 
 Under Pennsylvania law,  
when two or more writings are executed at the 
same time and involve the same transaction, 
they should be construed as a whole.  If the 
writings pertain to the same transaction, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
business expense.  See generally C.C.H. Standard Federal Tax 
Reports ¶ 7383.03 (1994). 
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does not matter that the parties to each 
writing are not the same. 
Black v. T.M. Landis, Inc., 421 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa. Super. 
1980)(citations omitted).  This general rule also applies where 
several agreements are made as part of one transaction even 
though they are executed at different times.  Neville v. Scott, 
127 A.2d 755, 757 (Pa. Super. 1956). 
 In the present case, the Haydens maintain that 
Pennsylvania law requires the settlement agreement and the 
annuity contract to be read together.  Both documents were 
executed as part of the structured settlement.  The settlement 
agreement specifically referred to the purchase of an annuity 
from United.  Although Ms. Hayden was not a party to the annuity 
contract, she was the annuitant and the payee of the contract. 
Furthermore, the settlement agreement and the annuity contract 
were executed within two weeks of each other.  Because Western 
agrees with this argument, we will assume that the two documents 
should be read together.  See Western's Reply Br. at 4.  Thus, we 
turn to consider whether the annuity contract contained a clause 
proscribing assignments by Ms. Hayden.   
 The Haydens contend that the following clause in the 
annuity contract proscribed assignments by Ms. Hayden:   
Protection from Creditors --  The Annuity 
payments will not be subject to the debts, 
contracts or engagements of any person 
entitled to such payments by the terms of the 
Contract.  Nor will any such payments be 
subject to any judicial process to levy or 
attach them.  This protection is given to the 
extent allowed by law. 
Id.  
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 For at least three reasons, we reject the Haydens' 
argument.  First, the plain language of the clause refers only to 
involuntary attachments.  As the title of the clause implies, the 
clause acts to protect the payee from creditors by preventing 
them from attaching the annuity payments.  The clause, however, 
does not expressly bar a voluntary assignment.  If the parties to 
the annuity contract intended to proscribe voluntary assignments, 
it would have been simple to add a clause to accomplish that 
purpose.  See Bank of New England v. Standlund, 529 N.E. 394, 395 
(Ma. 1988)(interpreting clause, which stated: "no income or 
principal . . . payable to any beneficiary . . . shall be 
attachable, trusteeable or in any manner liable for or to be 
taken for any debts, contracts or obligations of . . . 
beneficiary," to restrict only involuntary alienation because 
there were no "words that indicate[d] . . . [an] inten[t] to 
prohibit . . . beneficiaries from voluntarily assigning their 
interests in the [trust].") 
 Second, other provisions of the contract imply that 
this clause does not prevent voluntary assignments.  The annuity 
contract explicitly states that "the owner may assign an interest 
in th[e annuity] contract."  Western's Br. at Exhibit 3.  The 
owner can also be the payee.  If the protection-from-creditors 
clause prevents an assignment by "any person entitled to such 
payments by the terms of the [c]ontract," then it would prevent 
assignments by the owner when the owner was also the person 
entitled to such payments.  Thus, reading the protection-from-
creditors clause to bar voluntary assignments would contradict 
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the owner's right to assign an interest in the annuity when the 
owner was also a payee. 
 Third, even if the annuity contract's protection-from-
creditors clause proscribed the payee from voluntarily assigning 
her rights to receive payments under the annuity, this would not 
imply that in the instant case it prevents Ms. Hayden from 
assigning her rights to receive periodic payments under the 
settlement agreement.  Reading the annuity contract and the 
settlement agreement as a whole, it is clear that the protection-
from-creditors clause of the annuity applies only to the annuity 
payments.  The clause plainly states that it applies to "[t]he 
[a]nnuity payments."  We find no evidence to support the 
proposition that this clause was intended also to apply to 
payments made under the settlement agreement.  Consequently, we 
reject the Haydens' argument that Ms. Hayden's right to receive 




 For the reasons stated we hold that, as a matter of 
law, the documents executed by Ms. Hayden in September 1990 
constituted an effective legal assignment to Western of her right 
to receive the periodic payments provided for in the settlement 
agreement.  Thus, unlike the concurrence, we hold that Western 
now has a right to receive the periodic payments from Reliance 
and that Ms. Hayden no longer has a right to receive these 
payments.  In light of this holding we must reverse the order of 
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the district court in the adversary proceeding.  We need not and 
do not consider the additional arguments raised by the parties. 
Rather, we remand this case for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
